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the tradable goods sector.  Despite the large devaluations, the real exchange 
rate  at  the  end  of  1985 was  nearly  unchanged  from its  level  in the  early 
1980s. Beyond the income loss and unemployment,  the severity of the credit 
squeeze traumatized the financial and industrial sectors,  forcing many firms 
under  and  undermining  the  willingness  of  the  banking  system  to take  on 
lending risk,  factors that  would  later delay the recovery  of confidence and 
investment. 
The Aquino Government and 
Prospects for the Economy 
The  “New  Society”  proclaimed  by  Marcos  in  the  early  1970s failed  to 
produce  its  promised  improvements  in  the  welfare  of  Filipinos,  and,  as 
martial  law  continued, opposition to the Marcos  government grew. The oil 
shock and subsequent fall in commodity prices hurt incomes, particularly in 
the  rural  areas.  Although  measured  economic  growth  was  substantial, 
regional income disparities increased, and over the decade the proportion of 
the  population  living  in  poverty  remained  high.’  Continuing  arrests  and 
human  rights violations by  the military brought  protests,  particularly  from 
the Catholic church. 
But the most crucial loss of regime support came in those groups that had 
provided  the  initial  constituency  for martial  law. The patronage  machinery 
on  which  the  political  foundations  of  martial  law  rested,  especially  the 
particularistic interventions and the generation and distribution of  monopoly 
rents,  tended  over time  to narrow  the  base  of  political  support. By  1985 
Marcos’ base was dangerously thin. 
The early support for the government within the rural sector faded as the 
momentum of  land reform dissipated and as military abuses and corruption 
increased.  Even  though  agricultural  terms  of  trade  were  falling,  the 
government  increased  its  taxation  of  important crops through  export  and 
producer  levies  and  through  monopolization  of  trading  and  processing 
activities.  The increasing  incidence  of  rural  poverty  aided the  insurgency, 
and  the  communist  NPA  took  over  effective  administration,  including 
taxation, in several areas. 
Although  the  military  had  been  the  main  beneficiary  of  martial  law, 
opposition within the armed forces developed over promotions and over the 
deployment  of  forces  against  the  Moslem  and  communist  insurgencies. 
Before  1972,  the  Philippine  armed  forces  had  been  small,  relatively 
professional, and reasonably effective. Martial law greatly zxpanded the size 559  PhilippinedChapter 8 
of the military,  politicized its command  structure, and greatly increased the 
opportunities  for  personal  gain.  Loyalty  and  close  association  to  the 
president,  or  to  his  wife,  became  the  primary  criterion  for advancement 
within the services, and Marcos filled the highest posts with officers from his 
home province, Ilocos Norte, skipping over other officers in the ranks. Elite 
forces were created to protect the presidential palace, and military resources 
generally were concentrated in and around Manila. The path to advancement 
was through  the capital; less favored  personnel engaged  in the war against 
the communist and Moslem insurgencies, mostly in badly led and ineffective 
operations.  Soldiers  in  the  field  were  poorly  equipped  and  supported.  In 
many  cases they were forced to live off  the population,  adding to popular 
grievances toward the military. 
The business sector benefitted  under martial  law from restraints on labor 
organizing, the rapid rate of public investment, and the continuing protection 
of  the  manufacturing  sector.  Yet  by  1985  the  private  business  sector  had 
almost completely deserted Marcos, prominent industrialists were outspoken 
critics of  the  regime,  and white  collar  workers  in  the  financial  district  in 
Makati were protesting against the government.  The particularistic interven- 
tions that had  favored  associates  of  the  regime, the  creation  of  monopoly 
positions,  and  the  aggressive  takeovers  through  threat  of  ruin  alienated 
increasing  numbers  of  businessmen.  Many  sought  accommodation  with 
Marcos;  more  transferred  capital  beyond  the  government’s  reach.  The 
corporate  bailouts  of  the  early  1980s  spurred  protests  from some  in  the 
business sector,  and  there  was cautious, although  increasing,  opposition  to 
the  government.’  Marcos’  deteriorating  health,  the  undefined  succession 
mechanism,  and  the  possibility  that  his  death  would  lead  to a  seizure  of 
power  by  his  chief  of  staff, General  Fabian  Ver,  or by  his  wife,  Imelda, 
added to business unease. 
In order to diffuse  some of  the  internal opposition  to him  and pressure 
from  the  United  States, Marcos  instituted  political  reforms  in  a carefully 
controlled  fashion.  Martial  law  was  officially  lifted  in  1981,  although 
Marcos retained his ability to rule by decree. Presidential elections were held 
in  that  year,  although  the  opposition  refused  to  field  a  candidate  in  an 
election that Marcos controlled.  A legislature,  the Batasang Pambansa,  was 
created and elections were held  in  1983. The elections were also carefully 
controlled,  although opposition parties  did field successful candidates.  The 
Batasang was subordinate to the president; Marcos could overrule any act of 
the legislature and could dissolve the body if  he wished. 
But it was the assassination of Benigno Aquino on his return from exile in 
the United States that changed the political atmosphere in the Philippines and 
brought  continuing  and  widespread  public  protests  and  opposition  to  the 
Marcos  regime.  Political  violence  was  by  no  means  unknown  in  the 
Philippines and had characterized the local electoral process. But the killing 
of Aquino, the  most prominent  of  the  opposition  figures,  as he was being 560  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
escorted by military guard from the airplane on which he arrived, was such a 
shocking  transgression  that  it  irrevocably  altered  the  public  view  of  the 
regime.  For the first time, the Manila upper and middle class felt physically 
threatened by the Marcos government. 
In the end Marcos also lost his external support. The attitudes of the IMF 
toward  the  Philippines  changed markedly  after the reserves  overstatement 
discovery and the explosion in the money supply in the last half of  1983. The 
Fund imposed stringent conditions in the stabilization  program, including  a 
drastically  reduced  deficit  target  for  1985.  The  Fund  also  pressed  hard 
(although  unsuccessfully)  for reforms  in  the  sugar  and  coconut  industry, 
threatening  vital remaining  Marcos constituencies.  The World Bank  took a 
somewhat more sympathetic view, but its funding declined sharply after 1983. 
More important for the maintenance  of power in the Philippines  was the 
shift in attitudes of the United States. U.S. relations with the Philippines had 
improved considerably  with the inauguration of  President Ronald Reagan in 
1981. Vice President  George Bush  attended Marcos’ inauguration  after the 
1981 presidential  election, Marcos visited  the United  States in  1982, and 
Reagan  had  planned  a  visit  to  the  Philippines  in  1983.  The  Aquino 
assassination  and  the  growing protests  in  the  Philippines  and  the  United 
States  against  the  Marcos government played  a  role in  shifting  the  U.S. 
position.  But  it  was the  growing  strength  of  the  NPA  that  was  in  the end 
decisive, convincing even conservatives in the U.S. government that Marcos 
had  become a  liability  and that  fundamental  reforms would  have  to  take 
place in the Philippines. 
Despite mounting domestic and international opposition, Marcos remained 
a master of Philippine politics,  constantly keeping his opponents off balance 
and  exploiting  the  divisions  among  the  opposition  parties.  In November 
1985, in an attempt to diffuse pressure from the United States, Marcos called 
a  snap election  for 7 February  1986, counting on  the  divisions  within  the 
opposition and his control of  the electoral process to assure an easy victory. 
He erred on both counts. The two major opposition groups were able to unite 
on Corazon Aquino, the wife of  the slain opposition leader, as a presidential 
candidate, when  Salvador Laurel,  the  leader  of  the other group, agreed  to 
join  her  ticket  as  the  vice  presidential    and id ate.^  The  Marcos  political 
machine,  which  had  served  so  well  in  the  previous  twenty  years,  either 
deserted him or proved  unable  to deliver.  Marcos won the official election 
count, but only through  blatant  and extensive fraud that was evident to the 
numerous  foreign  observers who  had  gathered  in  the  Philippines for the 
election. 
In the weeks  that followed, the  opposition  refused  to accept  the official 
election  results  and  publicly  called for Marcos to step down.  Opposition 
party  members  organized  protests  and  called  for  a  boycott  of  financial 
institutions  that  were  associated  with  the Marcos  government,  leading to 
large deposit withdrawals from several government banks. 561  PhilippinesiChapter 8 
The breaking point came on February 22, when Marcos’ defense minister, 
Juan Ponce Enrile, along with General Fidel Ramos and a small number of 
troops,  set up a command  post  at the Manila  army base Camp Crame and 
declared their support for Corazon  Aquino. The failure of Marcos  and his 
chief  of  staff,  General  Ver,  to  quickly  move  against  the  rebels,  the 
mobilization  of huge numbers of civilians to surround and physically block 
loyalist  troops  from  entering  Camp  Crame,  and  an  eventual  flood  of 
defections  from  government  forces  left  Marcos,  by  the  time  of  his 
inauguration  on February  25, a virtual  prisoner  in Malacanang  pala~e.~  He 
left the Philippines the next day on a U.S. Air Force jet for Guam and then 
to exile in  Hawaii.  On 26 February  1986, Corazon  Aquino was  suddenly 
president  of the Philippines,  in an unexpected and uneasy alliance with the 
military. 
The presidential  election  and  its  immediate  aftermath  had  a  significant 
impact  on  economic  policy.  The  fiscal  and  monetary  discipline  that  the 
Philippines had exercised under its standby arrangement  with the IMF was 
abandoned to the cause of electoral survival. At the end of the third quarter 
in  1985, the Philippines was well within  targets for the money  supply,  but 
between  October  and  mid-February  the  money  supply  grew  by  over  50 
percent,  reaching  a  level  of  P.  44  billion,  well  above  the  March  1986 
program target of P.  39 billion.  The government  deficit ballooned  to P.  10 
billion in the first quarter, ten times the deficit of the first quarter of 1985 and 
more than the program target for the entire year. 
After the election,  the central bank sought to rein in the money supply to 
meet  the  IMF  program  requirements.  The  central  bank’s  efforts  were 
complicated  by  the  opposition-inspired  boycott  of  government-associated 
financial  institutions  which  severely  affected  several  commercial  banks, 
particularly  the Philippine National  Bank, and required  a sharp increase in 
emergency  assistance.  But  the  central  bank  persisted  in  selling  its  own 
securities, and by the end of June the money supply had been reduced by  13 
percent  to  P.  38.0  billion.  The  result  was  a  further  domestic  financial 
shock-Treasury  bill rates rose from 16 percent  in January to 24 percent  in 
February,  at a time when  inflation  was  decelerating.  Real  interest rates  on 
commercial bank loans reached 30 percent in the same period. The stringent 
monetary  actions  prevented  the  injection  of  funds  during  the  election 
campaign from translating into higher inflation or currency depreciation,  but 
those gains had a high price. Real investment fell by an additional 15 percent 
in  1986,  and  the  episode  further  unsettled  an  already  skittish  financial 
system. 
8.1  Challenges Facing the New Government 
Despite  the  mood  of  national  euphoria  that  accompanied  Corazon 
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faced were extremely  difficult ones, involving  both political  and economic 
reconstruction.  The Marcos regime had corrupted and nearly destroyed key 
Philippine  institutions.  The military  had  become  highly  politicized,  inti- 
mately involved in government, and accustomed to the patronage  flows that 
martial  law  had  created.  Public  esteem  for  the  armed  forces had  almost 
disappeared.  So had the effectiveness of the military as a force in countering 
the  communist insurgency;  in  1986 the NPA  was far better  organized and 
more  capable  of  mounting  operations  than  were  the Armed  Forces  of  the 
Philippines.  However,  despite  its  weakness  in  the  field,  the  military 
remained  a  potent  force  in  Manila  politics,  and  its  crucial  role  in 
precipitating the collapse of the Marcos government convinced many in the 
defense establishment  that  their position  was coequal with  that of  the new 
president. 
The Philippine judiciary had  also suffered under martial law.  The ability 
of  Marcos to dismiss judges at any level bent the judiciary into cooperation. 
Judicial decisions were increasingly based on influence or  on wealth during 
the latter years of the regime. Other democratic institutions had been greatly 
weakened.  The 1973 constitution  had been molded to assure Marcos’ hold 
on government and had been repeatedly  amended by him to suit immediate 
needs. The Batasang Pambansa, the legislature that Marcos created, had no 
substantive authority and was controlled by members of  Marcos’ party,  the 
Kilusang  Bagong  Lipunan  (KBL). Political  power and almost all  decision 
making had been centralized in Manila under martial law; local governments 
had  in  some cases been  superceded  by the military,  and the administrative 
ability of provincial and local governments weakened. 
Political issues and events dominated President Aquino’s first two years in 
power. The new  government moved  immediately  to dismantle the political 
structures that  Marcos left behind.  Aquino dissolved  the Marcos-controlled 
legislature.  She  dismissed  thousands  of  local  governors  and  mayors, 
replacing them with officers in charge, who would serve until elections could 
be held. The new government also moved quickly to recapture the assets that 
Marcos and his cronies had accumulated during the previous administration. 
Aquino’s  first  executive order established  the  Presidential  Commission on 
Good  Government  (PCGG) to pursue legal  action  against  Marcos and  his 
associates outside the Philippines,  and to identify and sequester their assets 
in the Philippines. 
Next was the need to provide a legal framework for the new government, 
and  to  begin  to  rebuild  the  institutions  that  had  deteriorated  or  been 
destroyed  by  martial  law.  In  March  1986 Aquino  declared  a  “Freedom 
Constitution”  that  gave her  the  decree-making powers  of  her predecessor, 
although  for a  limited  period,  included  a  bill  of  rights,  and called  for a 
convention  to draft  a  new  constitution.  The convention  produced  a  draft 
constitution  that was  approved  in a national  referendum in February  1987. 
The constitution provided for a legislature similar to the U.S. Congress, and 563  PhilippineKhapter 8 
congressional elections were held in May  1987. Local elections for mayors, 
governors,  and  other officials  were  held  in  January  1988,  completing  a 
process of four national referendums in just under two years. 
The other political  challenge the Aquino government  faced was assuring 
its own  survival.  Early  coup attempts  were  mounted  by  Marcos  loyalists. 
Later, more serious attempts were mounted by members of the armed forces, 
first  in  November  1986 and  then  in  August  1987,  in  a  coup that  almost 
toppled  the  government.  The  military  grievances  against  the  government 
were  several.  The  first  concerned  the  national  reconciliation  policy  that 
Aquino had adopted to deal with the Moslem and communist insurgents. The 
low pay and lack of support and equipment for military personnel also fueled 
discontent.  Furthermore,  military  officers  viewed  themselves  as  political 
participants; some of the same individuals who had first deserted Marcos in 
February  1986 were the ones who led the coup attempt in August  1987. 
The partnership between the military and the Aquino government remains 
uneasy,  and  the  military  itself  is  highly  factionalized.  The  Aquino 
government moved to satisfy some of  the demands of the military after the 
August  coup  attempt,  adopting  a  firmer  stance  toward  the  communist 
insurgency, increasing military pay, and removing from the cabinet members 
of  whom  the  military  had  been  especially  critical.  But  Aquino was  also 
forced to co-opt the  military  leadership,  appointing  and  promoting  on the 
basis of loyalty to the new government,  and this has increased resentment in 
some  quarters  and  set  back  the  process  of  professionalizing  the  armed 
forces. While the NPA is a more serious threat to the security of the country, 
the military remains a more immediate threat to the elected government. 
The Aquino government also faced serious economic problems,  as well as 
exaggerated expectations about what a new government could accomplish in 
the economic sphere. The recession of the previous three years had led to a 
sharp fall in per capita income, erasing the fruits of the previous eight years 
of growth. Open unemployment in Manila had doubled to 22 percent,  while 
rates  of  underemployment  were  estimated  at  40  percent.  The  import- 
substituting  industrial  sector  had  been  decimated  by  the  recession,  with 
production cuts in  some industries  as high  as 80 percent.  Real investment 
dropped by over half between 1983 and 1986, but substantial excess capacity 
and continued financial and political uncertainty  limited its recovery. 
The Philippines also faced the burden of the external debt inherited from 
the  previous  administration.  At  the  end of  1985 total  external  debt of  the 
Philippines was $26.3 billion.  Although  the total had  only  increased by  6 
percent  in the previous three years,  the ratio of Philippine external debt to 
GNP had jumped from 63 to 82 percent,  the result of declining economic 
activity and  the real  depreciation  of the  peso.  Net  external  borrowing  was 
almost  zero  for  1986, but  the  total  external  debt jumped  again  to $28.3 
billion. This was the result of the appreciation of the yen against the dollar 
during the year and the fact that about 15  percent of Philippine external debt 564  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
was denominated in yen.  By the end of  1986, the debtiGNP ratio had risen 
to 94 percent, placing the Philippines among the most heavily indebted  less 
developed countries. 
The 1985 rescheduling  had  reduced  the  immediate  debt  service burden, 
but in 1986 external debt service still absorbed 34 percent of total exports of 
goods and  services.  And  the  limited capital  inflow  under  the  restructuring 
agreement meant that, with interest payments and a current account surplus, 
the  Philippines  on  net  was  transferring  resources  to the  rest  of  the  world 
amounting  to  9  percent  of  GNP.  Furthermore,  the  debt  rescheduling 
agreement  was  to  expire  at  the  end  of  1986, which  meant  that  the  new 
administration had to turn almost immediately to a new round of negotiations 
with the country’s external creditors. 
As important, and more complicated,  were the fiscal problems facing the 
Aquino government.  These were especially crucial, for the fiscal constraints 
severely  limited  the  government’s  room  to  maneuver  and  its  ability  to 
respond to strident domestic demands. The Marcos government had reduced 
the  national  government’s  budget  deficit  to  1.9 percent  of  GNP in  1985 
(although it missed  the IMF target of  1.5 percent).  But the reduction in  the 
national  government  deficit  is  deceptive.  The  revenue  effort  of  the 
government,  the  share  of  total  government  revenue  in  GNP, had  declined 
markedly during the  1980s, increasing the required expenditure cuts to close 
the budget gap. In addition, the requirements for debt service and for support 
of  state-owned  corporations and financial institutions increased dramatically 
from  11 percent  of  expenditure  in  1982 to  35 percent  in  1985.5 The cuts 
came largely in government capital expenditures, which fell by more than 50 
percent  in  real  terms.  But  the  Marcos  government  had  also  drastically 
reduced  real outlays  for operations  and  maintenance  from levels that were 
already  low  relative  to  the  public  sector  capital  stock.  Not  only  was  the 
government  not  investing,  it  was  consuming  its  current  capital  stock  by 
neglecting  maintenance.  Public employment continued to expand during the 
stabilization period and was  11 percent (70,000 workers) higher in  1985 than 
in  1983. Real  wages of  public  sector workers fell, and  there  were critical 
pressures for wage increases for teachers and soldiers. 
Finally,  the  hemorrhaging  of  the  budgets  of  the  government  financial 
institutions continued to worsen in the first year of the Aquino government, 
as remaining government guarantees were called and as the interest burden 
of central bank securities increased. It was recognized early on that transfers 
to financial institutions  were going to increase in  1986; in fact they  almost 
doubled,  reaching  P.  24.2 billion,  or 23  percent  of  national  government 
expenditure and 4 percent of GNP.6 
The economic  landscape  facing  the  new  government  was  not  entirely 
bleak;  there  were  some  significant  advantages  that  assisted  the  new 
government in  its first year in office.  The first of these advantages was that 
the  Marcos  government  had  successfully  carried  out  the  stabilization 565  Philippinesichapter 8 
program required by the IMF. The current account deficit had been closed, 
and the aggressive  sale of central bank  securities had  reduced  the  inflation 
rate  to  below  historical  levels  by  the  end  of  1985.  Thus  the  costs  of 
stabilization  had  already  been  paid  by  the  time  the  Aquino  government 
came  into  office.  The  stabilization  program  had  its  weaknesses.  It  was 
more  severe  and  costly  than  the  situation  required,  and  it  was  also  pure 
stabilization-nothing  in  the  program  provided  structural  adjustments  that 
would encourage and sustain a recovery in the future.  But the achievement 
should  not  be  underestimated,  and  its  importance  to  the  succeeding 
government was real. 
The second  advantage for the Aquino  government  was that,  for the  first 
time in  many years, external events worked in its favor. Philippine terms of 
trade  rose  by  16 percent  in  1986,  the  largest  increase  since  the  1973 
commodity price boom. Almost all of this improvement came from the sharp 
fall in world oil prices, which reduced Philippine petroleum imports by $580 
million, or 2 percent of GNP. Commodity export prices were little changed 
until  the  last  quarter  of  1986,  when  coconut prices  rose  sharply.  World 
commodity prices rose strongly in  1987, and Philippine terms of trade rose 
by an additional 9 percent. International interest rates also slid during  1986. 
By  the end of  the year, LIBOR rates had fallen over two percentage points, 
saving the Philippines $200 million  in interest payments. 
The Aquino  government  was  the  beneficiary  of  substantial  international 
goodwill which  it was able to translate into additional concessional finance. 
Official  aid  flows for  1986 came to $1.4 billion,  over twice  their  level  in 
1985, although  not  as  large  an  increase  as the  Aquino  government  had 
originally hoped for. Additional grant funds came primarily from the United 
States, which increased  its Economic  Support Fund contributions  by  $100 
million, bringing the total to $300 million for the year. Major additional loan 
funds came from the Asian Development  Bank and Japan. The Philippines 
was also able to secure additional commitments for 1987 and beyond,  from 
the Japanese,  the Asian Development Bank, and from the World Bank for a 
$300 million economic recovery loan. 
The  successful  stabilization  program  and  the  end  of  the  Marcos 
government’s predation on the economy greatly diminished outflows through 
capital flight. Privately owned capital began to flow back into the Philippines 
in  1986  into  real  estate  investments,  the  Philippine  stock  market,  and 
campaigns for the congressional elections in 1987. As a result, pesos sold at 
a premium in the black market in Hong Kong, as residents sought to avoid 
the  official  market  in  Manila  (see  table  7.1).  Personal  transfers  to  the 
Philippines  also  increased  sharply  in  1986.  What  did  not  occur  was  a 
significant  increase  in  foreign  direct  investment,  despite  the  government’s 
desire for additional foreign capital.  Inward foreign direct investment flows 
increased  from  their  1985 level,  but  remained  well  below  their  1981-83 
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The final advantage that  the new  government had  when  it entered  office 
was the  general  revulsion  against  the excesses and  plunder  of  the  Marcos 
government. Aquino had campaigned on a platform of  reducing  the role of 
government  in business activities, doing away with particularistic  grants of 
privilege,  and returning  acquired  companies, as well  as many govemment- 
established  corporations, to  the  private  sector.  The widespread  desire to 
purge the country of  the institutions  of the previous government, the desire 
for  economic  reform  and  recovery,  and  in  addition,  the  disarray  of  the 
sectors that had  depended  on government protection  or largess, created  an 
opportunity for sweeping economic reforms.  Although economic policy was 
overshadowed  by  political  reconstruction  and political  crises,  the  govern- 
ment was able to push  through  fundamental  policy  changes that  had  long 
been advocated by external critics of the Marcos government. 
8.2  Economic Policy 
The Aquino government faced three types of  economic policy problems. 
The first  was  short-run economic policy  to achieve recovery  after almost 
three years of recession. The second was the establishment of  broad outlines 
of  economic  policy  for  longer  term  growth,  while  the  third  was  a 
renegotiation  of  the  Philippine  external  debt  with  official  and  private 
creditors.’ 
8.2.1  Recovery 
The  Philippine  stabilization  episode  was  unusual  in  that  domestic 
consumption  expenditure did not drop, but instead continued to slowly rise 
as households drew down their savings. By  1986 there was little reserve left 
to consumption that could be drawn on to support recovery. Investment had 
been  decimated  during  the  recession  and  dropped  further  in  1986,  a 
reflection  of both the high degree of  political and economic uncertainty and 
large excess capacity in most industries.  The government immediately  drew 
up a plan of  increased  public  expenditure to boost  the economy, primarily 
through  a Community Employment and Development Program (CEDP) for 
labor-intensive projects in rural areas. 
The targets under the previous IMF program for the Philippines had been 
exceeded  in  the  pre-election  spree  of  the  Marcos  government,  and  the 
government was unable to draw on the second-to-last tranche of the standby 
agreement.  Instead of  a waiver,  the government and the Fund negotiated  a 
new  standby  program  for the country.  The atmosphere in  the negotiations 
was  far more  cordial  than  that  of  the  previous  standby,  and the  resulting 
program  was more liberal than  its predecessor.  The program  allowed  a 30 
percent  growth  in base money  from March  1986 to March  1987, the  first 
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the  national  government deficit  from  1.9 percent of  GNP in  1985 to  4.4 
percent in  1986.8 The new  program, submitted in September and approved 
in October, was for $262 million over eighteen months, with an  additional 
$296 million available immediately under the Compensatory Finance Facility 
(IMF 1986~).  Although real government expenditure did increase in  1986, 
organizing and implementing expenditure programs was difficult for the new 
government. The CEDP employment program was slow in getting started, 
and at the end of  the year disbursements lagged well behind targets. Public 
sector investment also came in below targets due to a shortfall in expenditure 
by  government corporations. 
8.2.2  Policy Reforms 
The Aquino government had much greater success in implementing broad 
economic policy reforms.  Although these took place under the  shadow of 
political events, and not all reforms were achieved, by  mid-1988 the policy 
environment in  the Philippines had  been  fundamentally altered. Economic 
policy  was  more  neutral  in  rewarding  lines  of  economic  activity,  more 
transparent than it had been since the  1950s, and compared favorably with 
that of any other East Asian country. 
Understanding the success of the Aquino government in shifting economic 
policy  requires  some  discussion  of  the  ideological  bases  of  the  new 
administration. Although the opposition to the Marcos government in  1986 
covered  the  entire  ideological range,  the  1986 presidential  election  was 
contested by  only a limited segment of  the opposition. The two groups that 
united to field Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel as candidates were from 
the center to center-right of  the political spectrum, a group that has been 
characterized as “conservative  reformists”  (Lande 1986, 124). This group 
has provided the core of the new government, despite its appearance of being 
ideologically fractious. 
The  conservative  reformist  nature  of  the  cabinet  was  epitomized  by 
President  Aquino’s  choices  for  the  two  key  economics  portfolios.  The 
finance minister, Jaime Ongpin, was chairman of  Benguet Mining Corpora- 
tion and had also headed the citizens’ election commission, NAMFREL, in 
the presidential election. The central bank governor, Jose Fernandez, was the 
sole holdover from  the  previous  government and  had  been  appointed by 
Marcos,  under  pressure,  after  the  reserves  overstatement  discovery.  As 
central bank  governor,  Fernandez  had  been  responsible  for  much  of  the 
success, and the severity, of  the stabilization program. 
Other cabinet ministers represented a wider range of opinions. Furthest to 
the left was Labor Minister August0 Sanchez, whose pronouncements about 
labor justice and workers rights quickly made him the Aquino government’s 
bCte  noire  among  business  groups,  bankers,  and  U.S. officials.’  More 
centrist, but also outspoken, was Planning Minister Solita Monsod. Monsod 
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had been extended to the Marcos government, and argued for a case by case 
review and “selective repudiation” when funds had been knowingly lent for 
corrupt or questionable projects.  Within the cabinet, she has pushed for trade 
liberalization,  land  reform,  and  a  more  growth-  and  foreign-resource- 
oriented economic policy. 
The last key player on economic matters was Joker Arroyo, who held the 
powerful office of presidential executive secretary, or “little president” as it 
is known in the Philippines. Arroyo pushed for a more nationalist economic 
policy  and resisted efforts to sell off state-owned or -acquired corporations, 
using  his  control  over  the  flow  of  paper  to  the  president  to  sidetrack 
measures  he opposed. Arroyo was also a harsh critic  of  the military  and a 
focal  point  for  armed  forces  criticism  of  the  government.  He  left  the 
government  after the coup attempt  of  August  1987, in an arrangement  that 
also included the resignation of Finance Minister Ongpin.  lo 
Although the Aquino government did not have the benefit  of a transition 
period,  it  was  able to draw  on  a  group of  University  of  the  Philippines 
academics,  who  had  been  involved  in  critical  analysis of  the  Philippine 
economy in  the  latter  years  of  the  Marcos regime.”  This  group quickly 
prepared a policy agenda for the new government that became known as the 
“yellow  book”  (Alburo et al. 1986). The economic policies proposed in the 
yellow book were  essentially  conservative, market-oriented  policies, many 
of which had long been advocated by the multilateral institutions, the United 
States, and other outside observers of  the Philippine economy.’* 
The authors  of  the yellow  book  argued  for  greatly  reduced  government 
intervention  in  the  economy,  an  emphasis  on  alleviating  poverty  and 
achieving  distributive  justice  through  land  reform,  and  a  reorientation  of 
development  policy toward rural  areas. To  support the rural-based  develop- 
ment  strategy,  the  yellow  book  recommended  an  outward-oriented  trade 
policy, the elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports, the elimination 
of taxes on traditional exports, and the avoidance of  an overvalued exchange 
rate.  The authors argued  that  debt servicing  should  be  subordinated  to  the 
goals of  economic recovery and achieving growth, but they favored seeking 
additional  external  resources  to  sustain  growth  rather  than  reducing  debt 
servicing costs through unilateral action.  l3 Other recommendations included 
a shift in the basis of taxation toward direct taxes, the reduction of  taxes on 
financial  intermediation,  and  the privatization  of  much of  the government 
corporate sector. The recommendations of the yellow book became the basis 
for economic policy under the Aquino government, although implementation 
of some proposals has proved difficult.  l4 
The  Aquino  government  was  able  to  move  quickly  to  dismantle  the 
particularistic and monopolistic interventions of the martial law government. 
In  the  coconut  sector,  it  removed  the export levy  and the  prohibitions  on 
direct  exports  of  copra  and  new  investments  in  milling;  as a  result,  the 
spread between  world  and  farmgate copra prices  narrowed  sharply.  In  the 569  PhilippinesiChapter 8 
sugar  industry,  the  Aquino  government  abolished  the  Philippine  Sugar 
Marketing Authority (PHILSUMA) and its control over domestic and export 
sales.  A  new  regulatory  administration  was  set up  to  allocate quotas for 
domestic sales and sales to the U.S. market, with the quota certificates freely 
tradable  among producers. The government eliminated other monopolies, 
including those covering imports of livestock and most fertilizer. 
Fiscal Reforms 
Within a few months of coming to power, the new government agreed on 
and began to implement an extensive tax reform program, with surprisingly 
little  opposition. The program  had  several  objectives-to  raise revenues, 
improve the  responsiveness  of  the tax  system to economic growth, and to 
lower the taxation of  poor families.  Additional revenue came from increases 
in taxes on cigarettes and beer, the removal of tax and duty exemptions from 
publicly  owned  corporations,  and  the  adoption  of  a  uniform  corporate 
income tax  rate with  limitations  on allowable deductions. The elasticity  of 
the tax  system was improved  by converting excise taxes  to an ad valorem 
basis, by making tax rates more uniform and removing exemptions, and by 
plans  to  strengthen  collections.  Although  income  taxes  were  eliminated 
altogether for families below  the poverty line, and all export taxes, except 
those  on  logs,  were  removed,  the  program produced  a  net  revenue  gain 
estimated to be P.  15 billion in  1987, or 18 percent of total tax revenue~.'~ 
The reform proposal also included measures to strengthen tax administra- 
tion. The government approved plans to introduce a general value added tax 
of  10 percent  in  1988 to replace  the  poorly  performing  sales  tax  system. 
Tariff collections by the Bureau of Customs had been well below applicable 
duties  on  Philippine  imports.  After  considerable  internal  struggle,  the 
Philippines  engaged  the  services  of  a  Swiss  firm,  SociCtC  GCnCrale  de 
Surveillance, to do preshipment  checks on Philippine  imports from selected 
ports  to  improve  customs  collections.  The  Aquino  government  also 
introduced tax amnesty provisions to encourage payment of back taxes. 
The  elimination  of  monopolies  and  the  tax  reforms  were  primarily 
administrative  measures  that  could  be  carried  out  quickly  once  the  new 
government came to power. Other problems carried over from the previous 
government  were  less  easily  solved.  The  Aquino  government  inherited 
approximately 285 government corporations and subsidiaries, many of them 
creatures  of  the Marcos government, as well  as a huge  burden  of  external 
liabilities  and  nonperforming  domestic assets.  In  one of  her  first  acts in 
office,  Aquino  established  a  Presidential  Commission  on  Government 
Reorganization (PCGR) to study and make recommendations for reforms of 
government corporations, as well as public financial institutions. l6 
Under the recommendations of the commission, 125 government corporations 
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consolidated or converted to regular government status (Philippines 1987, 8). 
Along  with  the  reorganization  proposals,  the  Aquino  government  adopted 
policies to rationalize and increase the transparency of government support for 
the corporations. Government corporations were required to pay dividends on 
government  equity  and  interest  on  outstanding  government  net  lending.  In 
addition, the Philippines promised the Fund and the World Bank that it would 
clear up the arrears that had developed among public sector corporations and 
between the corporations and the national government. 
The  government  took  several  steps  to  deal  with  the  problems  of  the 
National  Power  Corporation,  the  largest  of  the  public  sector corporations. 
The  principal  difficulty  of  the  NPC  was  the  nearly  completed  but 
nonoperational  nuclear power plant,  and the $2.1 billion  external obligation 
associated with it. Various concerns had been raised about the quality of  the 
construction in the plant and the geological safety of  the site. Based on these 
concerns,  Aquino  decided  against  operating  the  plant.  The nuclear  power 
plant and its debt obligations were transferred to the national government to 
assist  the  rationalization  of  NPC’s  operations.  The  government  also 
announced  other reforms  in the power  sector,  eliminating  the tax  and duty 
exemptions enjoyed by NPC and declaring that it would gradually eliminate 
the subsidized provision  of electricity to Manila customers. l7 
Financial Institution Reform 
The  position  of  the  two  major  government  financial  institutions,  the 
Development Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank, was 
particularly  acute.  Almost  90  percent  of  the  assets  of  DBP  were 
nonperforming,  as were  well  over half  of  the  assets  of  PNB; in total,  the 
nonperforming  accounts  came  to  $7  billion. l8  Government  budgetary 
support for the  two  institutions alone  swelled to P.  16 billion  in  1986,  15 
percent of the budget,  and 2.6 percent  of GNP. National  government aid to 
nonfinancial public sector corporations added an additional P.  11 billion. The 
drain  on the  government  budget  posed  by  the nonperforming  assets of the 
financial institutions was an immediate concern of both the IMF and the World 
Bank, and became a qualitative performance requirement in the program that 
the new government negotiated  with the IMF. 
The Philippine  government developed a rationalization program for DBP 
and PNB in 1986, with the assistance of the World Bank and support from a 
$150 million  economic recovery  loan.  Under the program, both institutions 
transferred  their  nonperforming  assets  to  the  national  government, which 
also  assumed  the  corresponding  liabilities.  The book  value  of  the  assets 
transferred came to  P.  85 million  for DBP ($4.2 million) and P.  72 billion 
($3.6 billion)  for  PNB. Both  institutions  made substantial  cuts  in  staff  to 
reduce costs,  and PNB closed most of its overseas branches. 
The reform measures that the Philippines adopted with respect to PNB and 
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private commercial  banks. The obligations of the two institutions  would no 
longer carry government guarantees nor would the two have access to special 
credit or tax privileges.  Public sector deposits would no longer be available 
on the scale or at the low cost they previously enjoyed and, just like private 
commercial banks, both would be subject to external  audit. In addition, the 
government  agreed  that  social  projects  with  below  market rates  of  return 
would  be  funded  through  explicit  budgetary  support,  rather  than  at 
government behest through its financial institutions. 
The transfer of the assets of PNB and DBP to the national government and 
the government's assumption of the liabilities of the two institutions greatly 
reduced  the  share of  the  government in  the  domestic  financial  market.'' 
Under the restructuring program, the government pledged to operate PNB as 
an  ordinary  commercial bank,  eventually  offering shares  for  sale  to  the 
private sector as its profitability improved. The emphasis of DBP was to shift 
from  large-scale,  industrial  sector  loans  to  the  provision  of  credit  for 
agriculture, housing, and small and medium-sized  firms. The rationalization 
programs were largely successful; by  1988 both institutions were profitable. 
The Philippine government also pledged to sell off the six commercial banks 
that it had acquired. 
Privatization 
One  of  President  Aquino's  campaign  pledges  was  to  return  the 
corporations acquired by the government to the private sector and to sell off 
government  corporations  that  duplicated  private  sector activities.  The new 
government  established  an interagency  Committee on Privatization  headed 
by the finance minister and, as an implementing arm,  the Asset Privatization 
Trust (APT) headed  by  David  Sycip, a prominent local  businessman. The 
APT was given  a  five-year timetable  to dispose of  the  acquired  assets;  all 
sales were to be done in cash, with bids collected through  auction. 
The privatization program in the Philippine has proceeded  slowly and has 
revealed  deep  ideological  splits  within  the  government.  There  has  been 
widespread  dissatisfaction  among investors  over the pace of  the program, 
and recurring disagreements within the government over the assets that have 
been  included  or  left  out of  the  sales list. There has also been  no  single 
agency  responsible  for  carrying  out  privatization.  The  APT  has  been 
responsible  for the sale of  nonperforming assets transferred  to  it, and these 
have  come  almost  entirely  from  the  two  major  government  financial 
institutions.  In contrast, the reorganization  and privatization of  nonfinancial 
government  corporations  has been  left to the corporations themselves, and 
many  have  been  reluctant  participants.  At  the  end of  1987, the  APT had 
accepted  bids  for  over  forty  assets  for  a  total  of  P.  3.3 billion  ($160 
million).20 In these sales, the APT has been able to realize about 20 percent 
of  book value.2'  But as yet none of  the government corporations slated for 
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assets  that  the  government  holds  is  still  uncertain.  Despite  Aquino’s 
reaffirmation  of  her  government’s  commitment  to  proceed  with  its 
privatization  program, the program remains in doubt.” 
Trade and Industrial Policies 
The Marcos government had initiated  a tariff reform and trade liberaliza- 
tion program in the early  1980s under a structural adjustment program with 
the World Bank. The tariff reductions were successfully completed by  1985, 
but  little  progress  was  made  in  reducing  quantitative  restrictions  and 
licensing  requirements.  Both  the  tariff  reform  and  trade  liberalization 
programs  were  superceded  by  the  balance  of  payments  crisis  in  1983, as 
tariff  surcharges  were  applied  and  the  central  bank  imposed  foreign 
exchange allocation. Both the tariff surcharge and the central bank allocation 
of  foreign exchange were removed under the IMF program in  1985. At the 
end  of  1985,  the  Philippines  adopted  a  second  program  of  trade 
liberalization,  covering  1,232 items  subject  to  import  licensing,  but  this 
program  was interrupted  by the presidential  elections and by  the change of 
government in  early  1986. 
Trade  liberalization  was  among  the  policy  proposals  contained  in  the 
yellow  book  and  was  a  priority  of  both  the  IMF and  the  World  Bank  in 
negotiations  with  the  Philippines  in  1986.  Within  the  cabinet,  trade 
liberalization was pushed  strongly by Planning Minister Monsod.  However, 
trade liberalization quickly became the most controversial economic policy 
issue facing the Aquino government.  Liberalization was strongly resisted by 
industrial  groups,  represented  in  the  cabinet  by  the  minister  of  trade  and 
industry,  Jose  Concepcion,  as  well  as  by  several  leftist  groups.  The 
government decided to continue with  the  1985 program of trade liberaliza- 
tion,  replacing  the  import  licensing  requirements  with  tariffs  of  equal 
protective effect. By April 1988 all 1,232 items had been liberalized, and the 
government  was  committed  to  liberalizing  an  additional  104  items  by 
mid- 1989.  On  the  remaining  items  subject  to  licensing,  the  government 
decided to retain limits on  114 for health and security reasons,  and deferred 
decision  on the  remaining 455  items subject  to quantitative  restraint.  This 
last  list contains  many  of  the  most  sensitive  products-finished  consumer 
durables and  industrial  intermediates-and  the  IMF has continued  to press 
for their liberalization. 
The Marcos government also revamped the industrial incentive system in 
1983 as a part of the structural adjustment program.  The revised  investment 
incentives  made the encouragement of  exports a priority,  deemphasized  the 
measured  capacity  concept  that  had  been  used  to  define  overcrowded 
industries, and simplified and reduced the number of incentives.  Investment 
incentives were replaced with performance-based incentives covering profits, 
wages paid,  and the extent of domestic procurement of inputs.  As a result, 
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The Aquino government,  after  much  internal  debate and  delay,  finally 
issued its own set of investment incentives in the Omnibus Investment Code 
of  July  1987. Most of  the incentives  system remained  unchanged  from the 
1983 revisions.  The most  significant  modification  was the  replacement  of 
performance-based  incentives on net local content and net value added with 
income tax holidays.  In addition, the government appears to have increased 
the  scope  for  discretion  in  administering  the  incentives  by  reviving  the 
notion  of  measured capacity  and reinstituting  an investment  priorities  plan. 
The nature of the incentive program is still under discussion with the World 
Bank, and a further study of the incentive system is one of  the conditions of 
the Bank’s economic recovery loan to the Philippines. 
The policy reform momentum in the Philippines has, at least for the time 
being,  waned,  and  policy  debates over the  next  few  years  are likely  to 
involve  holding  actions on reform  measures  that  have  already  been  taken. 
The Aquino  government  has  moved  much  farther  in  some areas than  in 
others.  The  fewest  results  have  been  achieved  in  the  highly  visible 
privatization  program,  which  became  for  many  investors  a  barometric 
indicator of  the attitudes of the Aquino government. 
The Aquino government has had more success in policies establishing  the 
economic  framework,  or  environment,  in  the  Philippines.  And  despite 
varying  success, one should  not  understate  the degree of  reform  that  has 
been achieved. Government intervention in many domestic markets has been 
greatly reduced or eliminated, monopolies and exclusive privilege have been 
abolished,  and publicly owned firms are now on a footing similar to that of 
private  companies. A comprehensive tax  reform has been  undertaken in  a 
very short period of time. And the trade and industrial incentive reforms to 
which the Marcos government had committed itself have been taken up and 
largely  completed.  In  the  1980s the Philippines  has gone from being  the 
ASEAN country with the most stringent import protection to  a country with 
restrictions  comparable to other East  Asian  countries and  low by  interna- 
tional standards, as we point out in table 8. l. A recent World Bank mission 
concluded that “as a result of cumulative policy adjustments since 1980, the 
Philippine  regulatory  and  incentive structure  has fewer distortions than  at 
any time since 1950, and is now comparably  neutral with other East Asian 
countries’ ’.  24 
Land Reform 
There is one further policy issue that is important both for the economic 
development of the Philippines  and for its political stability, and that is the 
issue  of  land  reform.  Land  reform has  long  been  an  issue  in  Philippine 
politics.  In the period since independence there have been several efforts at 
reform,  mostly  confined  to  legislation  and  the  creation  of  agencies 
responsible  for  land  reform  efforts.  But  land  reform  has  largely  been 
undertaken for political reasons, either to mobilize rural support or to diffuse 574  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 8.1  Comparative Trade Protection, East Asian Countries 
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rural-based  conflict,  and  once  those  aims  were  fulfilled  reform  quickly 
subsided, being neither actively funded nor strongly pushed from the center. 
A  case in point  is the limited, although politically  successful,  land reform 
and  resettlement  efforts  during  the  Magsaysay  administration  in  the  late 
1950s  that  was  instrumental  in  sapping  the  Huk  rebellion,  a  communist 
guerilla  movement  that  grew  out  of  the  resistance  to  the  Japanese 
occupation. 
Ironically,  the  most  extensive, although  still quite  limited,  land  reform 
was carried out at the beginning of martial law, covering rice and corn lands. 
As on previous occasions,  land reform had  its political objectives: rallying 
rural  support  for  Marcos’  New  Society  and  threatening  the existing elite. 
Eventually,  however,  land  reform  was  used  as  a  way  of  enriching 
presidential  associates and Marcos  himself,  for the martial  law period  also 
saw  the  most  extensive  land  seizure  and  extralegal  manipulation  of  land 
claims in Philippine history.25 
Economic factors in the  1970s and  1980s have added to the pressure of 
rural  land  tenancy  and,  increasingly,  of  rural  landlessness.  Up  until  the 
mid-l960s,  a  growing  population  was  absorbed  by  an  extension  of  land 
under  cultivation,  particularly  with  resettlement  in  the  southern,  and 
Moslem, island of  Mindanao.  However, the Philippines reached the limit of 
further  land  expansion,  and  land  densities  have  grown  steadily  since  that 
time. The period  has also seen some shifts within the agricultural sector to 
high value crops, generally crops that require less labor input.  In addition, 
the development of  high  yielding rice strains in the  Philippines put greater 
emphasis  on  non-labor  inputs.  Add  to  this  the  fall  in  world  prices  of 
Philippine  commodities,  the  monopolization  and  increasing  effective  taxa- 575  Philippines/Chapter 8 
tion of  the agricultural sector, and the failure of  the manufacturing sector to 
generate  employment  opportunities,  and  the  result  was  increasing  rural 
poverty  and  landlessness,  as well  as a dropping urban real  wage.  Poverty, 
the abuses of the military in local areas, and the ceding of large tracts of land 
to cronies or multinational  exporters, greatly  increased  the  strength of  the 
NPA  in the rural areas and the importance of agrarian reform as a domestic 
political and security issue. 
Land  reform  held  a  central  part  in  President  Aquino’s  campaign  and 
government platforms and is a responsibility set down in the constitution that 
was drafted in  1986. However, very little was done on agrarian reform in her 
first year in office until a protest by peasants outside Malacanang  Palace in 
January  1987, in which police fired on and killed several protesters,  brought 
the  land  reform  issue immediately  to the  fore.  An  interagency  group was 
created  to develop  a  program  and,  after  opposition  within  the  president’s 
office  watered  down  several  drafts,  the  Comprehensive  Agrarian  Reform 
Program  (CARP)  was  released  in  late  May.  The program  would  start by 
completing the  agrarian reform  Marcos had  started  in rice and corn  lands, 
followed  by  reform  of  government-owned  and  sequestered  land,  before 
going on to redistribution of  sugar and coconut  lands.  Landlords would  be 
paid the market value of their land, 10 percent in cash and the remainder in 
government bonds, while tenants would purchase the land over a thirty-year 
period. 
Aquino did not  implement the land  reform program by  executive decree 
when  she  had  the  opportunity,  but  instead  passed  the  program  on  to 
Congress to determine the maximum area that current landlords could retain 
and the timing of the program.  After much debate, the Philippine Congress 
passed  the  CARP,  which  President  Aquino signed  on  10 June  1988. The 
CARP extends over ten years. Current landowners are allowed to retain five 
hectares of land, plus three hectares for each child over fifteen years of age. 
The  program  is  expected  to  cost  P.  332  billion  ($15.8  billion)  over  its 
ten-year  life, of  which  the  bulk  is for support services  and  infrastructure. 
Implementation is likely to be a difficult task.  In addition,  three-quarters  of 
all privately owned agricultural land is in plots of less than ten hectares and 
likely to be excluded from CARP. While the effect of CARP on rural poverty 
and  landlessness  is  likely  to  be  modest,  the  political  benefits  from 
implementing the program could be huge. 
8.2.3  Debt Renegotiation 
Economic recovery and policy reforms were the first two challenges facing 
the new Philippine government; the remaining one was debt renegotiation. In 
contrast to relations with multilateral institutions, the change of government 
brought  more politically charged and acrimonious relations with the Philip- 
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on the terms of  Philippine rescheduling  and debt service,  and the status of 
loans made by the banks to the previous government. 
Many of the loans made to the Marcos government  had been to support 
public  investment  projects,  or privately  organized  but  government-favored 
projects,  that  were  either  of  questionable  viability  or involved  substantial 
misappropriation of  funds. The suspicion of  many  in the new government 
was that the banks were cognizant of the uses to which the funds were being 
put and, therefore, bore some of the responsibility for questionable and now 
nonperforming  loans  made  to  the  previous  government.  The  calls  for 
case-by-case  evaluation  of  commercial  bank  loans,  with  repudiation  in 
egregious cases, came almost immediately after the formation of the Aquino 
government  and  were  most  closely  associated  with  the  planning  minister, 
Monsod.  The  finance  minister,  Ongpin,  and  the  central  bank  governor, 
Fernandez,  were  opposed  to  any repudiation,  and  they  won  the  argument 
within  the  government  in  1986.  President  Aquino announced  in  mid-year 
that  the  Philippines  would  honor  its  foreign  obligations,  even in  cases  of 
questionable loans. 
But  the  bitterest  bone  of  contention  between  the  Philippines  and  its 
creditor banks concerned  the  terms of  the  second rescheduling.  Philippine 
negotiators were strongly influenced by the outcome of the bank negotiations 
with Mexico in September  1986 that had provided $6 billion in new money, 
an interest  spread over LIBOR of 2 percentage  points,  and a contingency 
fund of $500 million if Mexican growth fell short of targets. Reacting to the 
Mexican outcome, the Philippines came to the negotiations in October with 
the demand that the Philippines be granted an interest rate spread of  over 
LIBOR. 
The Philippine negotiators had two arguments for the reduced spread. The 
first was that the terms of the initial rescheduling had been deliberately harsh 
in order to punish the Marcos administration. The Aquino government, they 
argued,  was committed  to the  refoms that the external creditors  had  long 
stressed and deserved a better program.  The second argument was that the 
Philippines had successfully followed its adjustment program, eliminating its 
current account deficit,  inflation,  and  external  arrears.  The Philippines  did 
not need and was not asking for additional new money and, the negotiators 
argued, the country deserved better terms than Latin American debtors, who 
had been less successful in adjusting. 
Most  of  the  members  of  the  bank  advisory  committee were  willing  to 
reduce the spreads of the original rescheduling agreement, but Citibank was 
initially  adamant  against  any  reduction  in  interest  rates  on  rescheduled 
Philippine debt.26 The negotiations with the bank advisory committee broke 
down in November  over this issue, but resumed  in January  when Citibank 
agreed to the negotiating position of the other advisory committee banks. 
The banks and the Philippine negotiators still remained divided over terms 
when the negotiations resumed. As a compromise measure, Ongpin proposed 577  PhilippinedChapter 8 
that the banks receive a higher interest rate spread if  they were willing to take 
the spread in the form of  Philippine Investment Notes (PINs). These notes 
were  dollar  denominated and  sold  at  discount,  but  their  terms  (six-year 
maturity, no interest payment) made their conversion into pesos for partici- 
pation in the Philippine debt equity conversion scheme particularly attractive. 
The initial proposal was rejected by  the advisory committee, but a revised 
version, making the acceptance of PINs optional on the part of the banks and 
guaranteeing a return of  5  percent, was accepted and formed a part of  the 
second Philippine rescheduling  .27 
The  Philippine  negotiators  and  the  bank  advisory  committee  reached 
agreement on a multiyear rescheduling on 27 March 1987 (table 8.2). The 
agreement restructured $3.6 billion  in debt falling due between  1987 and 
1992,  as  well  as  the  $5.9 billion  previously  restructured  in  the  1985 
agreement. The amortization period on restructured debt was lengthened to 
seventeen years,  with  seven and one-half  years'  grace.  The trade facility, 
which previously had been extended to mid-1987, was further extended to 
June 1991. There was no additional new money in the 1987 agreement. The 
$925 million new money from the previous agreement was not rescheduled, 
but the facility was repriced along with the restructured amounts. 
In the  agreement,  the  Philippine negotiators settled for  an  interest rate 
spread  that  was  slightly  higher  than  the  Mexicans had  received  in  their 
negotiations in  1986, as well  as an  arrangement that  allowed commercial 
banks to  book  higher earnings through  the acceptance of  PINs in  lieu  of 
Table 8.2  Philippine Debt Restructuring Agreements 
Commercial Banks  Second Round, July  1987  First Round, May  1985 
Amount  Maturity  Interest  Amount  Maturity  Interest 
($ billion)  (grace)  Spread  ($ billion)  (grace)  Spread 
Previously restructured  5.88  17(7.5yrs) 
Debt falling due  3.58  17(7.5yrs)  5.88  10(5yrs)  12 
New money 
1: 
Revolving trade credit  2.97  2.97  I! 
71 
8  Wyrs) 
3 
4 
First restructuring  0.925 
Second  0.00 
Total  12.26  9.69 
Official Creditors  Amount  Amount 
$ Billion  %  $ Billion  %  Period 
First round (20 December 1984)  0.725  100  0.258  60  Jan  85/June 86 
Second round (22 January  1987)  0.704  100  0.289  70  Jan  87/June 88 
Source: Central bank, Financial Plan Data Center. 
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cash. The interest rate spread on restructured debt, the trade facility, and the 
1985  new  money  agreement  was  seven-eighths  over  LIBOR.28  The 
negotiators  also agreed that  if  the  Philippines  were  to later ask  for  new 
money,  it  would  also  seek  to  reschedule  the  1985  new  money  facility, 
accepting  a  1  percent  spread.  The  agreement  on  the  interest  rate  was, 
however, made retroactive  to 1 January 1987. 
The  1987  agreement  significantly  extended  the  period  for  amortizing 
principal  on  Philippine  external  debt  and  reduced  the  interest  spread  by 
three-quarters  of  a  point.  As  a  result,  the  debt  service  ratio  for  the 
Philippines was reduced  from 48 percent before rescheduling  in  1987 to 34 
percent after. However,  the failure of the negotiators  to achieve an interest 
rate  spread  as  low  or  lower  than  that  received  by  the  Mexicans  was  a 
stumbling block to approval of the agreement in the Philippine cabinet. The 
terms  became  a  major  issue  in  the  Philippines  when,  shortly  after  the 
agreement  was  concluded,  Argentina  reached  an  agreement  with  its 
commercial  creditors  for  an  interest  rate  spread  of  2, the  same  as  the 
Mexicans had received and 
The results of the Argentine  negotiations  were greeted  in  the Philippines 
with dismay.  Finance Minister Ongpin declared  his  intention to reopen  the 
negotiations with the banks over the issue of  the interest rate spread, but was 
eventually dissuaded  by bank promises to take more interest in the form of 
PINS.  The  issue  of  the  interest  rate  spread  and  the  treatment  of  the 
Philippines  relative  to other LDC  creditors  remained  the  source of  much 
domestic  opposition  to the  1987 agreement  and  a focal  point  of  domestic 
opposition  to  Ongpin  and  Fernandez.  But the  arguement over spreads was 
almost  overshadowed by  the  reemergence of  the  Planters  Products  (PPl) 
issue. 
Barclays Bank, a major PPI creditor and a member of the bank advisory 
committee, refused to sign the rescheduling  agreement worked out in April, 
and  renewed  the  demand that  the  Philippine  government assume the  $57 
million  dollar  external  liability  of  the  fertilizer company. The Philippine 
negotiators  first  tried  to work  out  a  compromise but  in  the end President 
Aquino  agreed  to  assume  PPI’s  obligations  to  rescue  the  agreement and 
preserve its retroactivity to January  1. 
The PPI compromise and the whole debt rescheduling  package became a 
major domestic political  issue when, in an address  to the newly  assembled 
Philippine  Congress in July,  President  Aquino  charged that  the banks  had 
blackmailed the country into the agreement. In the months that followed, the 
external debt became the principal issue of  the Philippine Senate. Bills were 
introduced to repudiate part of the debt and to limit debt service to a portion 
of  foreign  exchange receipts.  Ongpin and Fernandez  were  called  to testify 
before  Congress  to  explain  and  justify  the  terms  of  the  rescheduling 
agreement. 
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8.3  Economic Recovery 
After more than two years of falling output, the Philippine economy began 
to recover in  1986. For the year as a whole, GNP growth was 2.0 percent, 
insufficient to prevent a third year of  declining per capita income. In  1987, 
real output grew by almost 6 percent, which was below the official target of 
6.5 percent but above most private forecasts. 
The recovery  in  1986 was  led by  exports and by  increased government 
expenditure,  the  product  of  election  spending early  in  the  year  and  the 
subsequent agreement with the IMF to allow a larger budget deficit for 1986. 
Consumption demand was weak, as households rebuilt private savings, and 
investment dropped by  an additional 15 percent to a level 60 percent below 
that  of  1983.  The  strongest  growth  was  in  the  agricultural  sector.  The 
increase in world prices for copra and coconut oil late in the year, the lifting 
of  monopoly  restrictions in  the  sector, and  the  end  to  the  ban  on  copra 
exports resulted in a doubling of  farmgate prices for coconuts. This greatly 
increased  rural  incomes  and  sales of  commodities in  rural  areas.  Export 
earnings  rose  by  almost  5  percent  during  the  year,  with  large  volume 
increases of coconut products, fish, and prawns. 
The recovery strengthened in  1987, with growth for the year estimated at 
5.9  percent.  Government  expenditure  rose  more  strongly  than  in  1986 
through increases in public sector wages and a gearing up of the employment 
generation program in rural areas. Consumption demand rose by  5.5 percent 
with  a recovery in  the demand for durable goods.  For the first time  since 
1983, there was growth in the industrial sector, where output increased by  8 
percent, based largely on sales to the domestic market. 
Two  particularly  welcome  signs  were  the  growth  in  exports  and  the 
recovery  in  domestic  investment.  Merchandise  export  earnings  in  1987 
totalled $5.7 billion, up by  18 percent from 1986. Particularly strong growth 
came from electronics exports, as the world market recovered; garments, as 
the United States, Canada, and the EC increased their bilateral import quotas 
from the Philippines; and fresh fish, as agricultural producers in the sugar 
areas  diversified  into  prawn  production.  Domestic  investment  grew  28 
percent in  1987 after three successive years of  sharp declines. Most of  the 
increase  in  investment  in  1987  came  from  domestic  sources;  foreign 
investment increased,  but  still remained  below  the  dollar  levels of  1981 
through 1983. 
The economic growth rate continued to accelerate in  1988, with growth 
estimated at 7.5 percent for the first three quarters, until typhoons late in the 
year reduced growth for 1988 as a whole to 6.9 percent. Investment provided 
the momentum in  1988, rising 26 percent in real terms. Foreign investment 
increased particularly rapidly, and foreign investment inflows increased by 
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8.4  Prospects for the Philippines 
Although  the  Philippines  has  made  a  strong  start  at economic  recovery 
and  policy  reform,  sustained  economic  growth  is  by  no  means  assured. 
Difficult challenges for the Philippines remain, both political  and economic. 
Much  of  the  early  attention  of  the  government  was  directed  to its  own 
survival.  The coup attempt  organized  by  military  officers  in  August  1987 
was extremely serious and nearly succeeded in toppling the government. 
In the period  since the attempted coup, the situation improved consider- 
ably.  The coup plotters  were  captured  and jailed,  and  Aquino has  taken 
actions,  described  above, to more closely bind  the  military  to the civilian 
government.  Although the threat of an overthrow has not disappeared, time 
is now on Aquino’s side. Congress has been established and its members are 
now  taking  a  more  active  role  in  the  policy  process. Political  parties are 
reforming  and jockeying  with each other for position.  The passage of  time 
has served to focus ambition  on the country’s  democratic  institutions,  and 
the next presidential  election in  1992, which President Aquino has said she 
will not contest, is no longer so far away. 
A less immediate, but ultimately  more difficult challenge is that posed by 
the communist insurgency. The NPA has an estimated twenty to twenty-four 
thousand regular forces and constitutes the best military force in the country. 
In comparison, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has a combat strength of 
about  fifty-five  thousand,  although  many  units  suffer  from  poor  training, 
support, and  morale (Kessler  1988, 10). Rural  inequality  has nurtured  the 
NPA, and the defeat of the guerrillas will require that the government carry 
out  both  a  rural  development  program  and  a  land  reform  program  that 
address questions of economic inequality in the rural areas. Recent arrests of 
NPA leaders have weakened the movement, but its hold on many areas of the 
Philippines remains. 
8.4.1  Economic Prospects 
The challenge  for  the  Philippines  is  the  same  as  it  has  always been, 
achieving and sustaining rapid  economic growth  in the  longer term. In the 
last part of the  1980s and the  1990s this will be a much more difficult task 
than in earlier decades, since the Philippines now has the burden of servicing 
a much larger external debt, and because obtaining external capital will be 
much  harder  than  before.  The necessity  of  achieving  economic  growth  is 
particularly  acute  because  of  the  momentum  of  population  growth  in  the 
Philippines, at 2.5-2.7  percent per year, the highest in the region. 
The  post-1983  stabilization  program  in  the  Philippines  cut  per  capita 
incomes,  effectively  wiping  out  the  gains  from  the  high  growth,  heavy 
foreign  borrowing  period.  The  current  Philippine  government  has  an 
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Philippines to  1983 income levels by  1992. Those outside the government, 
including  the  IMF,  have  adopted  more  modest,  but  still  optimistic, 
projections of 6 percent  real  growth per  year.  Achieving  even this rate  of 
growth  is  by  no  means  certain  and  will  involve  policy  reform  and 
perseverance,  external cooperation,  and some degree of luck. 
The most obvious difficulties that the Philippines will face are the burden 
of  servicing  its  external  debt  and  limitations  on  its  ability  to  borrow  to 
achieve higher growth. The recent official and commercial bank reschedul- 
ings resulted  in a significant  reduction of scheduled  amortization  payments 
on  external  debt,  as  shown  in  table  8.3.  However,  projected  interest 
payments still amount to 6 percent of national income, and the Philippines 
faces the burden of meeting the remaining  amortization  payments over the 
next five years. 
The debt crisis affects the Philippines and other LDCs not just through the 
difficulty in shouldering the current debt burden; it also affects their ability to 
grow out from under that burden.  The severely limited access to additional 
external  finance  is  for  most  of  these  countries  a constraint  on the  rate  of 
investment and growth. Difficulties in financing an emerging current account 
deficit did not affect the Philippines immediately,  primarily because of  the 
unexpectedly  large current account surplus in 1986. But the country has now 
reached  a point  where  the external  financing  constraint  is a real  one,  and 
additional external funds are necessary to sustain growth. The difficulty lies 
in  the  way  in  which  the  current  account  deficit  was  closed  during  the 
stabilization period. 
Table 8.3  Philippines Projected Debt Service, Government Projections 
(in billions of U.S. dollars) 
1987  1988  1989  I990  1991  1992 





Debt service after rescheduling 
of  which: IMF 
Interest as % of GNP 
Debt service ratio" 
Before rescheduling 
After rescheduling 
GNP (billion S) 
Exports goods and services 
Memo Items: 
4.40  5.44  4.59  5.22  5.43  5.17 
2.27  3.13  2.27  2.80  2.85  2.49 
2.13  2.31  2.32  2.41  2.58  2.68 
2.94  3.03  3.01  3.43  3.70  3.66 
0.98  0.88  0.82  1.13  1.25  1.07 
0.31  0.16  0.18  0.33  0.31  0.15 
1.96  2.15  2.18  2.30  2.45  2.58 
6.0  6.0  5.5  5.2  5.0  4.7 
49.4  56.9  44.7  46.5  44.4  38.1 
33.0  31.7  29.3  30.6  30.3  26.9 
32.79  36.05  39.94  44.38  49.21  54.41 
8.90  9.55  10.27  11.22  12.23  13.57 
Source:  Central bank. 
Notes: Reschedulings include monetary and nonmonetary debt. Interest rescheduled by the Paris Club. 
"Ratio of interest and principal payments to exports of goods and services. 582  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Between 1983 and 1986, Philippine merchandise export earnings fell by 3 
percent;  thus, the entire closure of  the current account deficit was due to a 
reduction in imports. After years of import substitution,  Philippine imports 
are  heavily  concentrated  in  capital  goods  and  imports  of  fuels  and  raw 
materials; only  about  16 percent  of  the  country’s  imports are made  up of 
consumer goods (table 8.4). 
The Philippines has been relatively  successful in reducing its dependency 
on imported oil, substituting coal and other sources of  domestic energy. But 
over a medium-tern planning range, the demand for oil remains quite price 
inelastic, and the oil import bill is largely determined by swings in the world 
price  of  oil.  Two  of  the  other  categories  are  closely  tied  to  domestic 
economic  activity-capital  goods imports  to the  level of  domestic  invest- 
ment and raw materials imports to industrial output. The behavior of each of 
these import components during the stabilization episode  is shown in table 
8.5.  Capital  goods  imports  as  a  percentage  of  GNP  dropped  rapidly, 
reflecting  the  sharp reduction  in domestic  fixed investment that took  place 
during the period. Although the drop in the share of  industrial output in GNP 
was not huge, those industries that depended on imported raw materials were 
particularly hard hit. Finally,  slack domestic demand, plus the weakness  in 
world  oil prices,  was  responsible  for the  drop in  oil  imports. In contrast, 
consumer  goods  imports  remained  constant  at  about  5 percent  of  GNP, 
despite their being low priority imports. 
Table 8.4  Philippine Import Composition (percentage) 
1970-75  1976-80 
Capital goods  35.7 
Mineral Fuels  13.1 
Nonoil raw  materials  36.4 






Source  NEDA, Philippine Staristical Yearbook, 1987 
Table 8.5  Philippine Imports by End-Use Category (percentage of GNP) 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Capital goods 








5.0  4.5  5.0  3.6  2.5  2.8  3.5 
5 .O  5.3  5.7  4.6  4.0  5.5  7.0 
6.4  5.4  6.2  5.2  4.5  2.9  3.6 
4.3  4.4  5.0  5.8  4.9  5.4  5.5 
20.7  19.5  21.9  19.3  15.9  16.6  19.6 
14.9  12.8  14.7  17.1  14.4  15.9  16.7 
26.1  25.7  25.1  20.1  15.1  13.0  14.0 
36.8  36.5  36.4  35.4  33.6  32.6  32.6 
Source:  NEDA, Philippine Staristical Yearbook. 1987. 583  PhilippinesXhapter 8 
The fact that  exports  did  not  contribute to  closing the  current account 
deficit  and  that  the  reduction  in  imports  took  place  in  capital  and 
intermediate goods explains why the current account balance has worsened 
sharply  as  the  economy  recovered.  Even  very  large  rates  of  growth 
of  exports  are  unlikely  to  change  this  outcome.  The  reason  for  this  is 
twofold.  The  categories of  exports  most  likely  to  increase rapidly,  elec- 
tronics and garment exports, have imported input contents of 65-80  percent, 
and thus their expansion will lead to a partially offsetting rise in imports. 
Other categories of  exports  that  are candidates for expansion will  require 
substantial new  investments, raising,  at least for a time, imports of  capital 
goods. 
Nor  is  there  likely  to  be  much  help  from  the  service  sector.  The 
Philippines is  unusual  among  the  LDCs  studied  in  this  NBER  research 
project  in  having substantial service export  earnings.  Despite net  interest 
payments amounting to 6 percent of GNP, the country ran a small surplus on 
service account in  1985 and  1986.29  Net  service receipts are expected to 
diminish and become negative by  1992 as the growth of the economy raises 
service  payments  and  because  the  prospect  of  weak  growth  in  Middle 
Eastern  countries limits expected earnings from construction and  Filipino 
labor overseas. 
As a result, medium-term projections for the Philippines all give current 
account  deficits  of  2-2.6  percent  of  GNP.  Current  account  projections 
prepared by  the Philippine government and the IMF are shown in table 8.6. 
The government projection assumes an economic growth rate of 6.5 percent 
per year between  1987 and  1992, and thus a more rapid rate of  growth of 
imports and exports than does the IMF projection which assumes a domestic 
growth rate of  6 percent per year. Even with growth of  export earnings of 
13-14  percent per year, the current account deficit rises to 2.6 percent of 
GNP by the end of the forecast period. 
The current account is not the only source of a need for external finance. 
In  addition,  the  Philippines  will  have  to  either  make  or  reschedule 
amortization  payments  on  its  external  debt  falling  due,  plus  achieve  a 
balance of payments surplus sufficient to allow reserves to grow along with 
imports. In some cases, financial commitments have already been identified, 
either  in  the  form  of  loans  that  are  being  drawn  down  in  tranches, 
commitments for external aid, or rescheduling that has already been agreed 
upon. But even with these three, there remains required finance that has not 
as yet been identified. 
Projections of  future financing requirements are less forecasts than they 
are planning exercises. One such projection for the Philippines is shown in 
table 8.7. For table 8.7 we use the current account projections of  table 8.6, 
along  with  scheduled  amortization  payments  on  medium-  and  long-term 
external  debt  before  agreed  upon  rescheduling.  The  overall  balance  of 
payments  is  assumed  large  enough  to  meet  servicing  requirements  on 584  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
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Services and transfers 
Interest payments 
Current account 
Percent of GNP 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1987-92b 













-  1.6 






-  2.0 











-  2.6 
-0.9 
-2.1 




-  2.3 
-  1.0 
-2.5 
-  1.5 
8.7 
-  10.2 
0.4 
-2.8 
-  1.2 
-2.6 





-  1.2 
-2.8 




-  3.0 
-1.2 
-2.5 
-  1.5 
9.3 
-  10.8 
0.0 
-2.7 
-  1.4 
-3.0 
-  1.4 
11.2  14.3 
-  12.6  13.3 
0.0 
-3.1 
-  1.4 
-2.6 
-1.4 
10.5  13.0 
-11.9  12.1 
0.0 
-2.8 
-  1.4 
-2.7 
Source:  Philippine projections are from the central bank.  IMF projections are from IMF (19881, p.  27, 
table 11. 
"The central bank projections were prepared in November 1988, while the IMF projections were prepared in 
May  1988. 
'Average  growth rate 
Table 8.7  Philippines Balance of  Payments Finance Projections 
(in millions of  U.S.  dollars) 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  I992 
Current account 
Medium- & long-term loans 
Inflow 
outflowa 
Direct investment (net) 
Other items (net)' 





-  539 
-  1,214 









-  743 










-874  -1,151 
-778  -874 
1,684  1,512 
2,462  2.386 
537  376 
324  350 
2,763  1,961 
1,883  993 
880  968 
1,293  446 
-1,972  -662 
-  1,240 









-  175 
-  1,402 
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Source:  Central bank. 
"Before rescheduling. 
bSbort-tenn capital,  monetization of gold, revaluation,  and errors and omissions. 
'Minus  sign indicates an increment. 
monetary debt and to allow reserves to grow sufficiently to maintain a level 
equivalent to three months of  imports. Current account financing makes up 
the largest component of the demand for additional finance, but not the only 
significant component; the financing gap in this projection,  even after likely 
rescheduling by official (Paris Club) creditors, averages just under $1 billion 
per year between  1989 and  1992. 585  PhilippineKhapter 8 
In early 1989 the Philippines has just begun its third round of foreign debt 
rescheduling. An agreement has been reached with the IMF for a $1.3 billion 
extended  finance  facility.  As  a  part  of  this  program  the  Philippines  has 
agreed  to  reduce  the  national  government’s  budget  deficit  through  a 
reduction  of  subsidies and  improved  tax collections.  The country has now 
begun  negotiations  with  its  official  and  commercial  bank  creditors.  The 
Aquino government is asking for new money in this round and has proposed 
a figure of $1.6 billion  from the  commercial  banks.  The commercial  bank 
negotiations  are likely to be  difficult  this time, just as they  were  in  1987. 
This  is  due  not  only  to the  increasing  reluctance  of  commercial  banks  to 
provide new money in recent debt rescheduling, but also because the funding 
available  to  the  Philippines  from  the  Multilateral  Assistance  Initiative, 
Japanese  foreign  aid,  and  a  possible  renegotiation  of  the  Military  Bases 
Agreement with the United  States are all uncertain.  Finally,  and ironically, 
the recent U.S. proposals on LDC debt made by Treasury  Secretary Brady 
have  increased  the  reluctance  of  commercial  banks  to provide  additional 
funds  before  the  status  of  their  existing  loans  under  the  proposals  are 
determined.30 For its part, the Philippines has decided to force the issue by 
proposing  a  substantial  increase  in  foreign  exchange  reserves  in  1989, 
requiring an immediate need for new money. 
8.4.2  Export Prospects 
Achieving sustained economic growth  and at the  same time limiting the 
current account deficit will  require a substantial rise  in Philippine  exports. 
But financing of import growth is not the only role that exports will play in 
the  Philippine  recovery.  Over the  course  of  the  stabilization  period,  both 
domestic  investment rates and domestic  saving rates declined.  Restoring  a 
higher  rate  of  domestic  investment  will  require  a  substantial  increase  in 
private and public saving rates in the Philippines, and this in turn will mean 
that the domestic market will grow less rapidly than output and income.  To 
make  all  of  this  possible,  exports must  be  a  leading  sector  in  Philippine 
economic expansion over the  near to medium  term.  A  final reason  for the 
importance  of  exports  in  Philippine  recovery  and  growth  is  the  lack  of 
success the country has had in achieving growth through production for the 
domestic market.  Rates of employment  growth and productivity  growth  in 
import-substituting  industries have been  distressingly  low,  and, at least for 
manufactured  goods,  export  industries  have  provided  the  only  source  of 
dynamism in the last ten years. 
As we have pointed  out in previous  chapters,  the structure of Philippine 
exports changed dramatically in the  1970s. Traditional primary commodity 
exports-sugar,  coconuts,  logs and lumber, and minerals-were  responsible 
for about 90 percent of export earnings in  1970, but only 50 percent by the 
end  of  the  decade.  Although  declining  in  importance,  these  commodity 
exports  still  maintained  substantial  influence  over  total  export  revenue. 586  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Slumping  international  commodity  prices  and  declining  Philippine  export 
volumes  of  these  primary  commodities  were  responsible  for  a  15  percent 
decline  in  the  dollar  value  of  merchandise  exports  from  1981  to  1986, 
despite  a continued  growth in nontraditional export volumes  and earnings. 
The influence of primary  commodities  in total  Philippine exports has been 
greatly  reduced  to a current share of  about  one-quarter,  although they  still 
account for a larger share of net export earnings due to their higher domestic 
content. 
For a variety of reasons,  the prospects for sustained growth in Philippine 
primary export earnings are not good, although some near term growth can 
be  expected  as export taxes  and  the  systems  of  monopoly  regulation  are 
removed. In the sugar industry, Philippine costs of production are estimated 
to be about 12 cents per pound, compared to a current world price of about 8 
cents  per  pound.  The  Philippines  benefitted  up  to  1984 from  favorable 
long-term  supply contracts it had negotiated  when  sugar prices  were high. 
Since those  contracts  have  expired,  Philippine  sugar  exports  have  gone 
entirely to the United States under the U.S. sugar import quota, where sales 
prices  have  been  about  18 cents  per  pound.31 Thus  even  a  substantial 
recovery  of  world  sugar prices  would  not  significantly  increase  Philippine 
export earnings.  The prospects for future sales to the United States are also 
bleak;  the U.S.  has reduced overall sugar import levels substantially  since 
quotas were reintroduced  in  1982 and announced substantial reductions for 
1988. For the Philippines this meant a reduction in quota from 240,000 tons 
in  1987 to  148,000 in  1988. The U.S. drought in  1988 brought an increase 
in  sugar  imports  late  in  the  year,  but  the  longer  term  outlook  remains 
unchanged. 
In the past two decades the Philippines has increased its output of coconut 
products  by  extending  the  area of  cultivation.  Limits  on cultivatable  land 
have been reached, and increasing output now depends on increasing yields. 
Philippine coconut production has been hampered by  low yields and aging 
trees, and total coconut production has fallen well below  the peaks reached 
between  1978 and  1981.  A  program  of  replanting  higher  yield  varieties 
would increase coconut output, but only after a gestation period  of  several 
years.  In  addition,  since  the  Philippines  accounts  for about  two-thirds  of 
world  exports of  coconuts,  and  coconut  products  face  competition  from 
other vegetable oils, the prospects for increasing earnings through additional 
exports are  quite  low.  Philippine  mining  exports have  some prospect  for 
growth if  world copper prices remain  high.  Philippine production costs are 
slightly  above  world  market  averages,  making  the  Philippines  a  marginal 
supplier although much of the country’s mining  capacity closed during the 
financial crisis. Gold is a byproduct of copper mining in the Philippines, and 
higher world gold prices have already raised mining earnings. 
The  prospects  for  expanding  manufactured  goods  exports  from  the 
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goods exports are dominated by two industries,  electronic components and 
garments,  which  together  account for 72 percent  of nontraditional  exports 
and  53  percent  of  total  exports.  As  a  result  of  the  protection  given  to 
Philippine domestic industry, both the electronics and the garment industries 
have developed  as virtual  enclaves, largely foreign owned, dependent upon 
imported inputs, and with few linkages to the Philippine economy other than 
the purchase of  labor.  Exports of  electronics components declined with the 
slump in the world  semiconductor market  in  1985 and 1986, but increased 
strongly  in  1987  and  1988.  Philippine  electronics  exports are diversified, 
with  the largest  share going to other ASEAN  countries, but  future growth 
will  depend  on  the  growth  of  the  world  market  and  the  continued 
maintenance of competitive real wages. 
Philippine garment exports go almost exclusively to the United States, and 
thus  the  prospects  for  growth  depend  considerably  on  the  degree  of 
protection  provided  to the  American  industry.  Despite this  fact, Philippine 
garment exports have  the potential  for substantial  growth. The Philippines 
has  not  been  as  aggressive  as  other  countries  in  increasing  its  bilateral 
quotas, although  it did receive  higher  U.S.  and European quotas in  1987. 
More importantly, the Philippines has not taken full advantage of  the quotas 
that  it  has.  Quota  utilization  by  the  Philippines  was  the  lowest  among 
ASEAN  countries  in  the  1980s and  fell  below  50  percent  in  1984 and 
1985.32  Other factors  work in favor of  the Philippines  in  the  longer term. 
The country has a small share of world exports of textiles and clothing, and 
both  its product  composition and export markets  are highly  concentrated, 
leaving open the possibility for diversification.  Finally, after years of  falling 
real  wages,  the Philippines  now  has  a  sizable  cost  advantage over other 
garment exporters in the region; only China has a productivity adjusted wage 
rate lower than that of the phi lip pine^.^^ 
The Philippines  also has the opportunity to increase net export earnings 
from the garment industry, and perhaps also from the electronics industry, by 
developing  backward  linkages  to  the  domestic  economy  as  have  other 
countries  in  the  East  Asian  region.  Successfully  substituting  domestic for 
foreign  inputs  will  require  that  the  Philippines  carry  through  with  its 
intention to reduce protection of  the domestic industrial sector, and will also 
require  that  incentives  for this  type  of  indirect  exporting match  those  for 
sourcing  components externally.  For  example,  subsectors of  the  domestic 
textile  industry,  in  particular spinning, knitted  fabric, denim,  and  sewing 
thread, appear to be competitive on world markets if the textile industry were 
to have access to inputs at world prices.34 
Diversifying export industries may be the most successful strategy that the 
Philippines can pursue in increasing exports over the next five to ten years. 
The prospects for developing new industries are especially  promising  in the 
rural  areas,  in  resource-based  or  labor-intensive  industries.  Already  the 
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other East Asian markets, and, before the land reform controversy erupted in 
mid-1987,  producers  in  sugar  growing  areas  were  making  substantial 
investments in prawn beds. Other possibilities for export crop diversification 
include  coffee,  cacao,  pineapple  and  other  fruits  and  vegetables,  black 
pepper, and ramie. To  a greater extent than growth from existing industries, 
growth  through  export  diversification will  require a more  aggressive and 
sustained array of policy incentives. Diversification of exports from the rural 
areas will require complementary inputs of capital and rural infrastructure, a 
settlement of the land tenure issue, and maintenance of  security and order in 
several of the rural  areas. Both agricultural and export diversification will 
also require a  shift  in  the  balance  of  production incentives to  encourage 
export  activities,  including  the  maintenance  of  an  appropriately  valued 
exchange rate. 
8.4.3  Financial Issues 
In  addition  to  overcoming the  external  financing  constraint,  achieving 
sustained economic growth  in the  Philippines will require solving several 
outstanding domestic  financial  sector  problems.  Financial  markets  in  the 
Philippines have been buffeted by a series of financial crises, starting in 1981 
and  extending  through  the  stabilization  episode.  The  burden  of  credit 
stringency fell largely on the private sector, and among firms that survived 
there has been a significant deterioration in financial ratios. By one estimate, 
nearly half of all firms are facing, or are likely to face, significant financial 
diffi~ulties.~~  These show up most often as problems in  servicing existing 
loan  obligations  or  difficulties  in  obtaining  adequate  working  capital. 
Furthermore, until the financial ratios of  these corporations improve, they 
are unlikely to be able to raise additional funds for investment or expansion 
as the Philippine economy recovers. 
Carrying out programs of  financial restructuring and  recapitalization for 
the affected firms will be necessary for them to participate in an expansion of 
the  Philippine economy,  and  given  the  number of  firms  involved,  these 
restructuring programs may  be required before significant growth can take 
place. This presents a number of  problems for the Philippines, since there 
has been little experience with financial restructurings of this kind, and since 
the  available  expertise  is  quite  limited.  The  necessary  expertise  may  be 
available through  foreign technical assistance,  but  the  restructurings may 
also require legal and procedural changes to write down the assets of current 
creditors and recapitalize the firms. 
The second and more general financial issue concerns the mobilization of 
domestic credit and the terms upon which it is made available to borrowers. 
The financial trauma of  recent  years in  the Philippines has  wiped out  the 
progress that the Philippines made in financial deepening in  the late  1970s 
and early  1980s. It  has also erased what had  been gradual progress toward 
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banks have been reluctant to perform any term intermediation. Furthermore, 
although interest rates were freed from administrative control as part of  the 
financial deregulation in the early 1980s, spreads between deposit and loan 
rates  in  the  Philippines  are  very  high,  averaging  16  percentage  points, 
compared to 3-4  percent for neighboring countries.36 Much of  the spread 
between  deposit and  loan  rates results from the  implicit taxation that  the 
Philippines  imposes  on  financial  intermediation  through  high  reserve 
requirements, the gross receipts tax, and the requirement that 25 percent of 
bank  lending go to agriculture or eligible government securities. The high 
taxation of bank intermediation and the resulting large spreads are issues that 
the Philippine government is currently studying and may soon address. 
To increase domestic savings made available through the financial system, 
and to lengthen the terms on which they are made available, the government 
must persuade the public that in the future there will be low and steady rates 
of  inflation  and  safety  in  financial  institutions.  Monetary  discipline  and 
avoiding the use of central bank credit for fiscal purposes should achieve the 
first. The maintenance of  the integrity of  financial institutions will  require 
closer and more effective supervision than the Philippine has so far known, 
more independent and professional management in many  institutions, and 
perhaps larger and more diversified financial institutions. The long history 
that the Philippine has had of financial scandal and mismanagement must be 
laid to rest. These same prescriptions should encourage the development of 
both longer term lending and longer term deposits. In addition, increasing 
use  of  floating rate  loans and the mobilization of  assets from public  and 
private insurance companies might also be used to encourage term credit. 
8.4.4  Sustaining Growth 
The  Aquino government has  made  considerable strides in  its  first  two 
years in office. The most egregious monopolies have been eliminated, curbs 
have been placed on government interventions and particularistic application 
of  law, the system of industrial incentives and protection has been reshaped 
in  more  neutral form,  and  reforms  have  been  undertaken  in  the  tax  and 
financial systems. The Philippines has  already begun to reap some of  the 
benefits of these actions, particularly in the agricultural sector, in an external 
environment  that  has  recently  turned  more  favorable.  However,  further 
actions will  need  to be taken,  and the Philippines will have to establish a 
reputation for consistency in policy in order to sustain an economic recovery. 
Several more  general  challenges to  policy  are  likely  to  appear  in  the 
coming years. The first, a waning of the momentum behind policy reform, is 
already beginning to  occur.  The  window of  opportunity presented by  the 
indignation  against  the  Marcos  government  has  narrowed  as  the  current 
government has become more established. This is most clearly seen in the 
flagging effort behind the government’s privatization program. Resistance to 
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revival  of  Philippine  nationalist  sentiment  and  a  reluctance  to  open  the 
economy  up  to  foreigners.  The  Philippine  Congress  has  already  passed 
several bills  raising  tariffs,  although  these  have  been  vetoed  by  President 
Aquino. 
Part  of  the  problem  for  the  Philippines  is  the  ambiguity  surrounding 
Marcos’  administration  and  his departure from the  Philippines.  There has 
been a tendency to attribute the poor performance of the country’s economy 
entirely to martial law and to cronyism, and to conclude that the end to the 
Marcos  regime  is  sufficient  to  turn  the  economy  around.  There  is  also 
ambiguity as to the policy  lessons that can be  drawn from the martial  law 
period.  The rhetoric of the Marcos  administration,  and much of the public 
perception,  was  that  this  was  an  export  promotion  regime  open to,  and 
encouraging, foreign direct investment,  and therefore that export promotion 
and international openness failed in the Philippines. In fact, as argued above, 
the  Marcos  government  continued,  and  in  many  ways  strengthened,  the 
system  of  protection  of  the  domestic  manufacturing  industry-the  Philip- 
pines received  the smallest gross inflows of foreign direct investment in the 
region and, at the same time, experienced substantial gross outflows, for the 
same reasons that domestic businessmen were moving their money overseas. 
Finally, and ironically, Marcos was a parvenu, an outsider who challenged 
the  traditional  political  system  in the  Philippines,  but  a  challenger  whose 
administration  went  badly  wrong.  The  “People’s  Power  Revolution”  of 
February  1986 was in many ways a restoration of  the former political  order 
and institutions, with a strong possibility  that the Philippines will resume the 
log-rolling patronage and obstruction to change that characterized the system 
before martial law. 
There was no consensus among the opposition to the Marcos government 
on the outlines of a broad economic policy, other than the desire to be rid of 
the most invidious of the institutions of  martial law, and the battle over policy 
direction will continue to go on within the government and the country. The 
arguments  that  are  marshalled,  and  in  many  cases the  outcomes, will  be 
influenced  by  external  policy,  particularly  that  of  the  United  States, the 
multilateral  institutions,  and the major creditor banks. The Philippines  is a 
small country, and politics and policy are to a large extent personalized. These 
external actors were quite conscious of their role in supporting the technocrats 
under martial law, and ultimately placed too much trust in their ideology and 
their  influence.  Perhaps  because  of  the  disappointments  that  flowed  from 
reliance on the technocrats, the external actors have not always been cognizant 
of their role in strengthening or weakening certain positions within the current 
Philippine government. 
Nowhere  has  this  been  more  apparent  than  in  the  1987  commercial 
bank rescheduling exercise. Despite the fact that the Philippines had success- 
fully stabilized the economy, deposed the man who was universally  seen as 
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type that had long been argued for, and was not asking for new money, the 
banks gave the Philippine negotiators an extraordinarily difficult time. Their 
heavy-handed  treatment  of  the  Planters  Product  issue,  holding  the  entire 
agreement hostage to the government's  assumption of the firm's  liabilities, 
their  failure  to  come down  further on  the interest rate  spread,  and  their 
subsequent delivery of the Philippine interest rate demand to the Argentines, 
led to the discrediting of Jaime Ongpin and Jose Fernandez, the introduction 
of  a raft of bills in the Congress on debt limitation or repudiation, and the 
departure from the government of Ongpin, who had been their strongest ally. 
Much has been said about the difference in the interest rate spread between the 
Philippine and the Argentine rescheduling, amounting to only $5 million in 
annual  interest  payments  for the  Philippines.  But  the  argument cuts both 
ways. The banks gained only $5 million, having squandered the precedent in 
the Argentine negotiation,  and lost Jaime Ongpin. 
Corruption, or more generally, the generation and distribution of economic 
rents, has been an enduring feature of the Philippine economy. The Aquino 
government has not been immune to this charge. Two cabinet ministers were 
dismissed early in the administration  after allegations that they were using 
their ministries for profit.  Members of  President  Aquino's  family, particu- 
larly  her  younger  brother,  have  used  their  ties  to  her  to  increase  their 
influence  and  wealth.  There  have  been  charges  that  the  activities of  the 
Presidential Commission on Good Government, set up to recover the assets 
of Marcos and his cronies, have diverted funds or transferred ownership to 
commission  members  or  their  relatives,  and  there  have  been  numerous 
stories  about  low-level  graft  in  the  country  even  after  the  change  in 
government.  37  Opposition  politicians,  particularly  the  former  defense 
minister Enrile, have charged the government with developing a new set of 
cronies, as bad or worse than those of  the Marcos government. 
Such  charges  vastly  overstate  the  case.  Corruption  in  the  current 
government  is  nowhere  near  the  organized  and  extensive  draining of  the 
economy during the Marcos administration. The issue for the Philippines is 
not so much whether there is corruption, but on what scale corruption takes 
place, and how much damage it does to the operation of the economy. The 
key for fostering economic growth is to limit the scope of possible corruption 
and  the  amount  of  activity  that  can  profitably  be  expended  in  seeking 
kickbacks,  privilege,  or other economic rents.  In  the  Philippine  case this 
means decentralizing  and localizing corruption,  so that  it is not run on an 
almost  economy-wide  basis  as  it  was  under  Mar~os.~'  It  also  means 
changing the nature of the rules and limiting the scope for discretion, so that 
entrepreneurial energy is channeled into production and not the competition 
for rents. 
This is the real importance of government reorganization and privatization 
in the Philippines. It is not so much an issue of whether the private sector is 
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operation of industry and economic outcomes from those who control policy. 
Other policy reforms, import liberalization  and the reform of the incentive 
structure, are important here because they shift the ground rules under which 
firms operate more toward neutrality  and universality,  and so direct energy 
into activities that are truly profitable for the society. So far, most attention 
has  been  placed  on  the  pace  of  liberalization  and  privatization.  More 
important are the terms on which these take place and the ground rules that 
are established. 
Finally,  to maintain  the policy reforms that have been  established  and to 
achieve stability in economic policy, the solutions to the difficult  economic 
problems  that  the  country  faces must, be  seen to be  in  Philippine  hands. 
Economic  ideology  in  the  Philippines  places  the  United  States and  U.S. 
influenced institutions in an ambiguous role. On one hand, the United States 
is  seen  as  the  source  of  Philippine  problems4olonial  dominance, 
exploitation  by  foreigners-but  the  United  States  is  also  viewed  as  the 
ultimate savior and guarantor of  the Philippine  situation.  There has been  a 
strong  sense  of  deus  ex machina  in  Philippine  thinking  about  policy,  a 
feeling that the United States would intervene to save them, when in fact the 
United  States  has  treated  the  Philippines  carelessly  for most  of  postwar 
history.  The  Philippine  desire  for  an  external  solution  to  its  current 
difficulties was seen in the expectation, immediately  following the February 
revolution,  that the Philippines  would be the recipient of  a flood of foreign 
aid and direct investment, as well as the tremendous interest in a “Marshall 
Plan”  for the Philippines  when such a proposal  was introduced  in the U.S. 
Congress at the end of  1987. While a program will definitely go forward in 
what  has  now  been  renamed  the  Multilateral  Assistance  Initiative,  the 
amount of  additional  funds will be  far less than  the $10 billion  originally 
suggested. It is also evident in the number of “solutions”  to debt difficulties 
that have been proposed-the  recovery of the Marcos fortune, the bargaining 
demand that the United States take over the Philippine debt in exchange for 
a  new  bases  agreement,  even  the  government-sponsored  search  for  the 
“Yamashita treasure,”  a vast fortune in gold rumored to have been buried by 
Japanese soldiers. 
But the economic problems of  the Philippines go beyond debt and beyond 
its relations with the United  States and the rest of  the outside world. If  the 
Philippines  is  to  achieve  rates  of  economic growth  that  would  allow it  to 
rejoin  the  income  ranks  of  its  neighbors,  it  will  require  fundamental 
reorientation  of  domestic  economic  policy  toward  a  more  pragmatic, 
instrumental,  and growth-oriented  stance. Much intellectual  effort has been 
expended  in  the  search  for the policy  recipe  that  was responsible  for the 
rapid growth of Japan and other East Asian countries, as if simply repeating 
the steps would duplicate their outcomes. But the success of these countries 
came primarily from their almost single-minded devotion to growth based on 
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In contrast,  much of Philippine policy,  and certainly  much of Philippine 
nationalism, has been defensive in character, designed to insulate and protect 
the economy from the outside world and the dangers perceived there.  What 
the  Philippines  needs  to  develop is  a  more  aggressive  and  self-confident 
nationalism,  one that  manipulates and takes advantage of the opportunities 
that the outside world offers-an  “inward  culture and an outward economy” 
rather than the reverse (Intal  1987). 
In fact, the situation in which the Philippines  finds itself today is not so 
different from the  situation characterizing  many of  the industrializing  East 
Asian countries before their rapid growth took place, although none had the 
foreign indebtedness that the Philippines now shoulders. Japan, Hong Kong, 
and  Singapore each  had  to  deal  with  an  unfavorable  economic  event that 
drastically  limited their options and forced them to focus on export growth. 
For Taiwan and Korea it was the imminent reduction in U.S. aid which had 
supported domestic investment and large current account deficits that forced 
the shift in policies. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  adversity  always  leads  to  success,  or  that  the 
problems  that  the  Philippines  now  faces  are no more  difficult  than  those 
faced  by  the  East  Asian  exporters.  Nor  will  Philippine  prospects  be 
unaffected by events and policies in the outside world. External markets that 
stay open to LDC exports, rather than  markets  that close down at the first 
sign of exporting  success, will  have  a tremendous  influence  over whether 
economic policy in those less developed countries encourages production at 
world  prices  for world  markets.  A  commercial  bank  lending  process  that 
recognizes  and  rewards  successful  policy  reform  and  economic  growth, 
rather  than  a  concerted  lending  process  that  provides  the  minimum  in 
financing  that  a  country  can  get  by  with,  will  also greatly  influence  the 
incentives  for  persevering  in  reform.  But  whether  the  Philippines  will 
ultimately be successful will be primarily determined by the actions that the 




insurgency which has troubled the Philippines for the past two decades. 
1. The tensions created by this migration are the primary force behind the Moslem 
2. Golay (1961, 202), Table 39. 
3. On the problems of collection of Philippine taxes, see Golay (1961, 186-91). 
Tait, Gratz, and  Eichengreen (1979) provide a comparison to  other countries, and 
rank  the Philippines near the bottom in tax  effort. 